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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines fifteen cases of collective action in six villages in rural 
Bangladesh. Collective action was defined broadly and identified from significant 
episodes in previous life-history research in the same villages. The types of 
collective action identified were catalyzed by marriage; dowry and domestic 
violence; disputes over land; illness, injury and death in accidents; and theft and 
cheating.  The role of development NGOs was less significant than would be 
expected considering their visibility in rural Bangladesh. The study suggests that 
‘everyday forms’ (Scott 1985) of collective action often occur spontaneously and 
informally, with significant impact on peoples’ wellbeing, but with ambiguous 
outcomes for some poor people involved. This is a different picture that is usually 
understood in Bangladesh – due to the visibility of NGOs – particularly by outsiders. 
Local government elected chairs and members play a key role in collective action 
events, which often include local arbitration, or shalish, hearings. A deeper 
understanding of how collective disputes and struggles are commonly managed in 
everyday life should help us to hold a more realistic view of the empowerment 
potential of interventions aimed at fostering collective action in rural Bangladesh. 
Keywords: collective action, disputes, Bangladesh, social norms  
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1 
EVERYDAY FORMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION IN BANGLADESH  





(with Rafiqul Haque, Dilara Hasin, Md. Abdul Aziz and Anowara Begum) 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies of collective action usually start with a definition of what the author means 
by collective action, often with references to collective action theory.
2,3 In many of 
these discussions, collective action is defined in terms of organized agency by a 
group to promote its own interests, or rationally directed towards a particular 
common goal.
4 This often leads to research strategies that identify and sample 
cases of collective action, and explore how they contribute to the promotion of 
collective interests or common goals. Collective action research has been 
particularly successful in understanding how beneficial public goods can be 
fostered, such as in the management and coordination of common property or 
natural resources, and in the prevention of public ‘bads’ as in the ‘tragedy–of–the–
commons’ or free–rider–type problems. 
This study is nested in a larger research project exploring poverty dynamics 
in Bangladesh (see Davis 2007; Quisumbing 2007; Baulch and Davis 2008) and 
examines fifteen instances of collective action identified by field researchers during 
the qualitative phase of our research project in six villages in four districts (see 
Tables 1–4 below). Households for life history interviews were a random sample 
from each of four categories of household identified in a previous longitudinal 
household survey.
5 In this part of the study we were interested in seeing which 
forms of collective activity (formal and informal) emerged as significant in the 
everyday lives of rural people in the sites we were studying without any initial 
preference for the type of collective activity. 
The aim of this study was to explore the kinds of collective action that were 
most significant in the life trajectories of rural Bangladeshis. The idea was to 
explore what was happening in terms of collective action in rural Bangladesh ‘on 
the ground’ rather than defining ‘collective action’ too rigidly in advance. The notion 
                                                      
 
1 Corresponding author: p.r.davis@bath.ac.uk. 
2 See Meinzen–Dick et al. (2004) for a recent discussion of collective action theory. 
3 See McAdam et al. (2001) for an excellent theoretical development of collective struggle. 
4 A common definition of collective action used in discussions is that of Marshall (1998) who 
defines collective action as “action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an 
organization) in pursuit of member’s perceived shared interests.” See also Meinzen–Dick et al. (2004), 
pp. 4–10. 
5 The categories were: 1) households which had moved up across the national poverty line 
between 1994 and 2007; 2) households which had moved down across the national poverty line; 3) 
households which had remained below the poverty line; and 4) households which had remained above 
the national poverty line.  
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of people acting together in a group towards a certain goal was key; however, we 
also wanted to recognize that collective action may not necessarily be beneficial for 
all, nor empowering for all, nor always coordinated, nor planned, nor without 
conflict. 
We decided to identify and sample events and sequences of related events, 
which involved collective action of some kind and which had had a significant 
impact on the wellbeing of certain people (enough that it had been identified in our 
previous life history research). We wanted to better understand the dynamics of 
common forms of collective action in rural Bangladesh using a broad and inclusive 
definition of collective action – somewhat broader than in studies that focus on 
resource management and coordination problems – in order to gain a realistic 
picture of the context and types of collective action that were most significant in 
affecting people’s wellbeing. 
The collective action was not necessarily restricted to actions which were 
rationally aimed at achieving group interests – we recognized that the motivation 
behind collective action was often complex and messy, with instrumental, value 
orientated, affective, or traditional motivational orientations, as in Weber’s four 
ideal types of social action (Weber 1922). We also wished to avoid the assumption 
that collective action was, by definition, beneficial, or that it always consisted of 
action oriented towards a rationally perceived and unified group interest. 
In many collective action studies we sometimes get a picture of organized 
groups managing irrigation systems, common property, or natural resources, where 
collective action can resolve coordination and tragedy–of–the–commons–type 
problems. However, when we sample using life histories we get a slightly different 
and, we would argue, more realistic picture of the more significant and common 
forms of collective action in rural Bangladesh. These actions are motivated as much 
by commonly held values, traditions, and feelings of fairness and justice as by the 
need to coordinate to achieve perceived common interests. By defining and 
sampling collective action in this way we also found that while NGO–related groups 
were present in our research sites, their activities were not the most common, nor 
significant, forms of collective action.  
Our findings suggest that the kinds of collective action that really count for 
poor people in Bangladesh are complex, often messy, and very difficult to 
conceptualize. However, many studies of collective action focus on planned 
activities fostered by formal organizations and neglect the more informal activities 
that seem to actually have more impact on peoples’ everyday lives. The tendency 
of over–estimating the significance of NGO–sponsored collective action in 
Bangladesh is understandable considering the success of NGOs in the delivery of 
micro–finance in the country.
6 In rural Bangladesh collective action is often 
assumed to involve these organizations and to lead to empowerment of some kind. 
                                                      
 
6 NGO–organized groups are ubiquitous in rural Bangladesh. Many studies of collective action in 
Bangladesh focus on the activities of these groups. In our research, NGO groups were ever present, 
but their main role in the communities we studied was in facilitating micro–finance provision and 
collection of repayments rather than having other collective–action outcomes. The authors are aware 
of a number of NGOs who focus on collective action in Bangladesh, such as Nijera Kori (see Kabeer 
2003); however, in the sample of life histories we used in our six villages, it was non–NGO–related 
collective action that showed the most significant impact on people’s life trajectories.  
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In this paper we examine a number of activities that can be described as 
‘collective,’ but were, in the main, not planned or linked to formal organizations or 
NGOs, and produce ambiguous ‘empowerment’ outcomes. However, in our 
experience, these types of collective action – often catalyzed by marriage and 
dowry disputes, land disputes, helping people after accidents, and collective 
responses to crime or injustice – are most typical of everyday collective action and 
contestation in rural Bangladesh. 
This paper explores a range of complex everyday collective activities 
identified in six Bangladeshi villages. We refer to these types of incidents as 
‘everyday forms’ of collective action, alluding to the hidden ‘everyday forms of 
resistance’ identified by James Scott in his studies of peasant communities in 
South–East Asia (Scott 1985). The episodes described involved a range of 
intermediaries, used both formal and informal channels, and showed patterns of 
strategic behavior enabled or constrained by the norms related to respectability, 
justice, reciprocity, subsistence, and gender. They tended to arise quite 
spontaneously, often in response to a crisis or disagreement.
7 
The cases which emerged as most significant in terms of people’s wellbeing 
illustrate how various events at local levels often catalyze collective action, which is 
then often mediated by local power–brokers, such as local government chairs, 
members, and other political leaders acting on behalf of, and often pressured by, 
groups of villagers. Non–governmental development organizations (NGOs) 
providing micro–finance were ubiquitous in the study villages, but – perhaps 
surprisingly – their influence did not feature strongly in the incidents of collective 
action we identified. 
CONCEPTS AND METHODS 
We were interested in understanding the relationship between various forms of 
collective action, the various resources, assets and power people held, and the way 
these combined to influence people’s wellbeing – particularly poor people, and 
especially poor women. Our initial conceptual framework in Figure 1 formed the 
basis of discussions at the project launch workshop held in Dhaka in July 2007. In 
this diagram we depicted the link between assets/resources and wellbeing through 
the social context of groups, networks and identities in which collective action 
occurs. During the workshop, breakout–groups of policy makers and development 
practitioners discussed what should be included in a study of collective action in 
rural Bangladesh. One of the points repeatedly emphasized by workshop 
participants was that most collective action (widely defined) in Bangladesh is 
spontaneous and informal and not necessarily organized or facilitated by formal 
organizations such as NGOs, which are particularly concentrated in Bangladesh.
8  
                                                      
 
7 See Roy (1994) for a detailed anthropological study of a complex village conflict, which 
developed after cows were discovered eating a neighbor’s crop in Bangladesh and eventually involved 
large numbers of people. 
8 See Davis and McGregor (2000), Davis (2001), Devine (2003, 2006), Lewis (2004), and Lewis 
and Hossain (2008) on the role of NGOs in Bangladesh.  
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These discussions then guided us once we were in the field, where we 
concentrated on identifying cases of collective action which had had a significant 
impact on the wellbeing of research participants and their co–villagers in the 
research sites. We were concerned with exploring the gender dimensions of 
collective action and interviewed both men and women with a four–person research 
team (two men and two women). We had already conducted life–history research 
(see Baulch and Davis 2008) in these sites so we were able to identify collective 
action events that had had a significant impact on people’s wellbeing as reflected in 
the life histories. This method of sampling provided different picture of the relative 
importance of various events in people’s lives than if we had used collective action 
organizations as an entry point for sampling. 
The study used a sub–sample of the CPRC–IFPRI
9 panel study in six villages 
in three district sites: Manikganj, Jessore and Mymensingh/Kishoreganj.
10 In each of 
the districts, two villages were selected, and, in each village approximately twenty 
life history interviews had formed an entry point (see Baulch and Davis (2008) for a 
description of the life history methods). The life–history households in turn were a 
subsample of a longitudinal household survey of over 2000 households across 14 
districts (see Quisumbing 2007). 
Figure 1: The social context of collective action: linking power–resources 
to poverty and wellbeing 
   
                                                      
 
9 CPRC stands for Chronic Poverty Research Centre. IFPRI is the International Food Policy 
Research Institute. 
10 These sites were chosen for this study of collective action because they were where a previous 
study had focused on the impact of NGO organized agricultural technology interventions. The 
Mymensingh/Kishoreganj site spanned the district boundary: one village was in Mymensingh and the 
other in Kishorganj. Because the sites were geographically close, they were treated as one ‘site’ in the 
study. 
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In our previous research (see Baulch and Davis 2008), life–history interviews 
were used to explore upward and downward trends in wellbeing of individuals 
within households and relate them to various causes, including collective activity. 
Once a number of collective action events were identified in these life–history 
interviews, these events became the subject of a separate set of case studies. By 
starting with the life histories we were able to identify the most important events in 
terms of the influence on wellbeing based on experiences which emerged during the 
narrated life histories. 
In the collective action case studies we focused on exploring social 
relationships, patterns, and processes, which linked the wellbeing and 
empowerment of women and men to various forms of collective action. 
Empowerment was seen in terms of the ability of people to seize opportunities to 
improve their lives and change their communities on one hand, and the ability to 
cope with various shocks and crises that may befall them, on the other. Thus 
empowerment was seen in terms of the enhancement of opportunity and the 
reduction of vulnerability. 
The research team spent about ten days in each site at the end of 2007 
investigating these episodes of collective action. Up to 11 interviews per case were 
carried out with a range of people linked to each case. A snowballing technique was 
used to identify research participants where previous participants helped to identify 
other local people who were also involved in the particular collective action event. 
Female researchers interviewed women, and the male researchers interviewed 
men. All the interviews were audio recorded, and the transcripts and field notes 
were analyzed and explored using nVivo 8. 
CAUSES AND PATTERNS OF EVERYDAY FORMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Collective action occurs in many spheres of life in rural Bangladesh. Across the 16 
villages where we conducted life–history interviews, we were aware of collective 
action involving a range of organizations. Examples of these activities include NGO 
organized cooperative groups, irrigation cooperatives, and groups organizing labor 
migration. However, this study focused on six villages, and Tables 1–4 provide a 
summary of the fifteen cases of collective action which were identified and studied 
in these six villages. These cases of collective action could be grouped in various 
ways. Here, we have chosen to group them according to the type of event that 
catalyzed them. The catalysts of collective action varied, but tended to be events 
with a potentially disruptive impact on the wellbeing of a person or people involved: 
 
1.  Events linked to marriage, dowry, divorce, and domestic violence (5 
cases); 
2.  Events linked to disputes over land ownership or land occupation (5 
cases); 
3.  Events linked to a person’s illness, injury, or death (3 cases); 
4.  Events linked to theft or cheating (2 cases).  
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MARRIAGE, DOWRY, DIVORCE OR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (5 CASES) 
There were five cases (see cases 1, 6, 10, 11, and 14 in Table 1 below) which were 
catalyzed by events linked to marriage, dowry, divorce or domestic violence. In four 
of these cases, a boy and a girl were involved in what were considered by the rest 
of the community to be unacceptable relationships. In all cases, large numbers of 
people (often more than one hundred) were involved in negotiating and pressuring 
various parties to ensure what could be collectively seen as a just or respectable 
outcome. 
In the arrangement of marriage in rural Bangladesh there are invariably high 
economic and social prestige stakes, and conflict and collective action often occur 
when things are seen to go wrong. When this happens, relatives (often beyond the 
immediate nuclear family), village leaders (matbars), and local government leaders 
(Union Parishad (UP) chairmen and members) are usually involved. Local 
arbitrations (shalish) are commonly part of the process (sometimes involving a 
selected jury board to make a decision). All of the five cases discussed here 
involved shalish hearings, and, out of our total of fifteen cases of collective action, 
thirteen involved shalish hearings.  
The shalish is a longstanding social institution in rural Bangladesh, which is 
seen as a local, informal alternative to a formal court–case. Village leaders (matbar, 
morol), local government chairs and members and other respected people are 
called to discuss and arbitrate, along with the people involved in the cases. In the 
case studies examined, many of the disputes were addressed in shalishes, and 
these were usually dominated by the most powerful men in the area. However, it 
seemed that in many of the cases the outcome was seen to be fairer than outcomes 
from formal court cases, which are often delayed and more likely to be influenced 
by bribery. In some case studies (e.g. cases 6, 10, 11, and 14), court–cases and 
shalishes were used in the same dispute. The formal court–case was a fall–back 
option if the shalish outcome was not seen as acceptable to one of the parties. 
Often, the parties agreed to withdraw formal cases during the shalish so that a 
resolution could be finalized informally. 
It is also common for one party to disregard the shalish either by not 
appearing or by ignoring the settlement that is agreed upon. This happened in 
cases 4 and 7. This was more possible if the party was no longer resident in the 
village and therefore less bound by local expectations. Not turning up to a shalish, 
or disregarding decisions made were frowned upon as contravening norms of 
respectable behavior. 
Shalishes have the advantage of drawing from collective intimate local 
knowledge of complex events. They also seem less likely to lead to outcomes which 
contravene locally held norms of justice or fairness. However, they are dominated 
by powerful men and tend towards outcomes that maintain the peace and uphold 
patriarchal norms of respectability, particularly when it comes to decisions about 
marriage and dowry. In three of the five cases linked to marriage and dowry (cases 
10, 11, and 14), alleged abduction or rape had been reported by one party. 
However, the shalishes that dealt with these cases focused on keeping the peace 




It may seem unusual to consider the shalish a form of collective action. 
However, the shalishes involve large numbers of people (up to 150 in these cases) 
and remain an effective, while imperfect, way of resolving local disputes and 
addressing injustices. They do allow voice for poor people, operate with 
considerable transparency, and draw from an intimate and collective knowledge of 
the situation. However, they tend towards outcomes which are unlikely to challenge 
local power structures and tend to reinforce patriarchal values, particularly in issues 
dealing with marriage, dowry, divorce, and violence against women. 
We are in conceptually difficult territory when we consider how shalishes 
relate to collective action as it is usually conceived. Obviously, a group of people, 
which is usually one faction in a dispute, can act collectively to influence the 
outcome of a shalish. However, the shalish itself can also itself be seen as an 
episode within collective action – of a group of people attempting to find an 
acceptable solution to a dispute – and the outcome will reflect prevailing norms and 
the prevailing balance of power in the community. Many NGOs have campaigned to 
increase women’s voices in local shalishes. In the cases we examined, women 
certainly had an influence, but this was more in working behind the scenes than in 
taking a leadership role in what are still particularly male dominated occasions. 
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Table 1: Cases involving marriage, dowry, divorce, or domestic violence 
 














The elopement and secret marriage 
of a boy and a girl led to conflict, 
informal arbitration, compensation, 














Domestic violence and abuse led to 










A boy was blamed after a teenage 
girl became pregnant. The child was 
aborted. Acid was thrown on the girl 
by an unknown assailant (two 
different parties blamed different 
people). She was treated in hospital 
in Dhaka with help from an NGO. 
Court hearings followed, and a 
settlement was reached involving an 
arranged marriage to the boy and 
gift of land to the girl’s family. 
2001 
Relatives, police 
UP chairman, NGO 
workers, lawyer 
A marriage was 
arranged 
between the boy 
and the girl after 
the boy had 
spent about 6 
months in prison. 
Some money was 
given by an NGO 




Alleged rape and pregnancy outside 
of marriage led to a dispute, a local 
shalish, and marriage arrangements 
of the alleged rapist to the girl. After 
the marriage, arguments over 
further dowry payments led to 
domestic violence and to a court–







that the boy 
should marry the 
girl and set a 
dowry to be paid. 







Abduction and forced marriage of a 
teenage girl. A court case followed, 
but the eventual settlement was 
achieved through 2 shalishes. A 
marriage was arranged between the 
girl and the boy who kidnapped her. 
He later got a job abroad, and the 
girl was treated badly by his family. 
This led to a second shalish, which 
decided that she should live with her 















the girl to live 






LAND DISPUTES (5 CASES) 
The transfer of ownership of land is fraught with difficulties in rural Bangladesh. In 
order to sell land, or change its ownership a number of official papers are needed: 
the ownership registration document, the government land record, and land tax 
receipts. Sale, inheritance, and gifting of land, as well as less scrupulous forms of 
appropriation of land, are the main ways that land ownership changes. 
Expropriation (jal kora) of land by force combined with corrupt changing of 
deeds occurs frequently. Because of the possibility, via corrupt means, to alter title 
deeds (for example, case 4); many people are forced to defend the title to their 
land in court. Often, these cases take several years, or in some cases, decades, to 
resolve. In the meantime it is often the party with the strongest power base who is 
able to occupy the land in question. In case 7 below a disabled man legally owned a 
plot of land but was unable to occupy it because he was being threatened by 
previous owners. Also, in cases 12 and 13 below, land was legally owned, but the 
owners were prevented from occupying it by other more powerful people. The 
occupation of land involved a group of supporting villagers helping the owner to 
physically take control of the land. The support of local leaders was also crucial in 
coming to a settlement. 
From these cases it seems that the resolution of land disputes often goes 
against the party with less social power. In these cases four out of five cases had 
an unsatisfactory conclusion. Land disputes and collective action over land 
ownership seemed to be more a symptom of the disempowering effects of 
widespread corruption in land administration and in the courts, rather than a 
reflection of empowerment. Improved land administration, reliable adjudication and 
conveyance would reduce the number of harmful local conflicts over land and 
prevent powerful people from illegally occupying land owned by the less–powerful. 
When collective action occurs in these cases, it is an attempt to mobilize social 
power in order to achieve an outcome favorable to a particular faction or party. The 
collective action will therefore not necessarily lead to a just or fair outcome. 
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Table 2: Cases involving land disputes 
ILLNESS, INJURY AND DEATH (3 CASES) 
Two cases (cases 2 and 15) of death in traffic accidents led to collective action 
which forced monetary compensation to be given to the victims’ families. In both 
cases mobs gathered at the accident scene shortly after the event and held up and 
damaged vehicles. Then a process of negotiation took place. Strong norms of just 
compensation and the right to subsistence (for example, of widowed women) come 
into focus in these events. The action of the mob is instrumental, but also affective, 
value oriented, and traditional in its motivation – to use Weber’s (1922) ideal types 
of social action. The threat of damage to vehicles leads to compensation being paid 












4  Jessore  A dispute over the ownership of 
land led to formal court cases but 
was followed by a resolution 
through informal arbitration. 









7  Kishoreganj  A disabled man bought land, but 
the first owner refused to allow 
him to use the purchased land. A 
shalish ruled that the first owner 
should hand the land over, but this 
was refused. 







9  Kishoreganj  Land dispute led to violence and 
injury. Settlement was made 
through a village shalish organized 
by the UP chairman 








over by the 
UP chairman. 
12  Manikganj  A poor man discovered title deeds 
to land that his father owned, but 
this land was occupied by a 
wealthier villager. With the help of 
local leaders (matbars) and the UP 
chairman and members he was 
able to occupy some of his land 
but only after a violent dispute 
with injuries and a court–case. 






been able to 
occupy some 
of his land. 
13  Manikganj  Land dispute after the vendor took 
money from two different parties 
for the sale of the same land. Local 
leaders arbitrated, and an 
unsatisfactory compromise was 
reached with the weaker party 
disadvantaged. 











In cases 2 and 15 the main bread–winners of households were killed in traffic 
accidents. It was considered fitting by local people that the bus and truck owners 
involved in the accidents should provide a substantial lump sum (about Tk. 25000 
and Tk.14000 respectively) to provide for the families of the victims. Collective 
action involving coercive force and the threat of violence by a large group of people 
was used to force a settlement negotiated with the chairman and a member, and, 
in case 2, the police.  
In case 8 included here, a teenage girl was blinded after a reaction to bad 
medicine given by a qualified doctor to treat a fever. Most of the ‘collective’ 
measures taken to try to attain adequate medical care were carried out by 
relatives, which included blood donated by her father and her uncle, raising money 
to pay for treatment, and extensive search of alternative treatment from many 
places. Her extended family sought alternative medical care from a sequence of at 
least 12 different doctors in various hospitals and clinics and two traditional healers 
(kobiraj). The family estimate that about Tk. 120,000 was spent on seeking 
treatment, including the mortgage of cultivatable land. The girl is permanently 
blinded and is still living with her parents. 












2  Jessore  Death of a poor man in a road 
accident led to collective protest 
and compensation for his family. A 
mob of local people damaged the 
bus and other vehicles. The local 
police–officer–in–charge (OC) and 
UP chairman negotiated a 
settlement with monetary 
compensation given to the widow 
and her children. 
2000 Relatives  and 
neighbors, 
Officer in 









given to family 
from bus 
company, 






due to poverty. 
8  Kishoreganj  Teenage girl blinded after a 
reaction to poor medical treatment 
for a fever. Most of the measures 
taken were carried out by 
relatives.  
2000 Doctors,  kobiraj The  girl  is 
living with her 
father. 
15  Manikganj  Deaths of two brothers in traffic 
accident. Monetary compensation 
given after collective lobbying by 
UP chairman, relatives, and 
neighbors. Marriages were 
arranged for the widows by 






were given Tk. 










THEFT AND CHEATING (2 CASES) 
The cases in Table 4 below were caused by a theft (case 1) from a local shop and 
fraud (case 2) during arrangements for a migrant labor visa by an agent. In case 1, 
burglary of a small shop led to a wider village conflict and violence. One faction in 
the village pressured the victim to take out a court–case against their enemy, and 
later other villagers persuaded the victim to withdraw the case. A violent clash 
ensued with injury and hospitalization and further court–cases taken out. A village 
collection was organized by local leaders, and the victim was compensated for the 
theft because he was considered poor and disabled. Large numbers of villagers 
were involved in this case, and local government officials were pressured to 
coordinate a just outcome in conjunction with the police. 
In case 5 arrangements were made for labor migration overseas, but false 
visas supplied by an agent led to local conflict and court cases. The victim has 
suffered a large monetary loss (more than Tk. 100,000). Attempts were made by a 
group of friends and relatives to catch the agent with help from a chairman and a 
relative who was in the army. The agent has so far managed to avoid being forced 
to return the money he cheated from the victim. 
Table 4: Cases involving theft and cheating 
 
KEY ACTORS AND INTERMEDIARIES IN EVERYDAY FORMS OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 
Union Parishad chairs and members were key actors in most of the collective action 
incidents identified. They presided over shalish hearings which were sometimes 












1  Jessore  Burglary of a small shop led to a wider 
village conflict and violence. One 
faction in the village pressured the 
victim to take out a court–case against 
their enemy. Other villagers persuaded 
the victim to withdraw the case. A 
violent clash ensued with injury and 
hospitalization and further court–cases 
taken out. A village collection was 
organized by local leaders, and the 
victim was compensated for the theft 











5  Jessore  Arrangements for labor migration 
overseas. False visas supplied by an 
agent leading to financial loss, local 
conflict, and court cases. 









held in a school playground). They also we called on for signatures when police 
cases were withdrawn, organized village collections, negotiated with the police, and 
made sure hospital treatment was given. In case 1 the chairman talked to doctors 
on behalf of one of the injured villagers before arranging for a CT scan to be carried 
out in Khulna. Mobile phones facilitated much of this communication. UP chairs and 
members also arranged marriages in cases 1 and 2. 
Matbars were also active in these events, but their power seems less 
effectual than in the past.
 11 Leaders who had links to political parties, the police, 
army, or business were more influential than other matbars who did not hold the 
same power–resources. 
In many events large numbers of villagers were involved. In case 1, up to 70 
villagers went together to get a signature from the chairman so that a false case 
could be withdrawn from the police; in case 3 between 100 and 150 people were 
present at the shalish held in the UP office to resolve problems caused by the 
elopement of a boy and a girl; and in cases 7 and 9, 50–60 people attended 
shalishes in attempts to resolve land disputes.  
In only one case (case 10) NGO workers were involved, when hospital 
arrangements in Dhaka were made for the acid attack victim. However, NGOs and 
NGO workers were not included in many of the other collective action events 
explored. It seems that NGOs operated outside the local structures of power which 
village people negotiated in struggles for justice, resolution of conflict, 
compensation, or access to scarce resources such as land. There has been much 
debate in the literature (for example, Kabeer 2001, Kabeer 2003, Lewis 2004, 
Devine 2006) over the empowerment potential of NGO activities including micro–
finance loans to poor rural Bangladeshis. This study suggests that the NGO–based 
micro–finance provided in the villages studied had little relationship with the more 
everyday forms of collective action. 
The police were key actors in investigating incidents when a ‘case’ had been 
logged with them either as a general diary entry (GD) or when the First Information 
Report (FIR) was made. In some cases, police action was coordinated in 
cooperation with the UP chair. In case 1 the police accepted the withdrawal of a 
case once a signature was gained from the UP chair and member. In case 7 the 
officer–in–charge (OC) of the local police station negotiated monetary 
compensation for a widow of a traffic accident victim from the transport company. 
SOCIAL NORMS AND EVERYDAY FORMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
At least four categories of sets of social norms can be identified in the reports of the 
cases examined. These can be linked to respectability, justice, reciprocity, and 
subsistence. 
People who were deemed respectable presided over shalishes, and 
disregarding a shalish was seen to be breaking social norms of respectable 
behavior. In addition, the protection of the good name of girls was a high priority 
with implications for their marriageability. The protection of a good name or social 
                                                      
 
11 This impression is also supported by Lewis and Hossain (2008) where they report on the 
diminishing influence of matbars in village disputes (p42).  
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prestige (bhalo nam, man shonman) is one outcome sought in episodes of collective 
action. Social standing has wider economic and social consequences for a family – 
thus the quick marriage of a daughter whose reputation has been compromised was 
seen as essential to protect her own and her family’s reputation. A family with a 
poor reputation can be disadvantaged in various ways in the labor market, business 
dealings, further marriage negotiations, and physical insecurity. 
Achieving justice was seen as important and collectively perceived injustice 
can sometimes lead to spontaneous outbreaks of collective action. The extreme of 
this is displayed in uncontrollable mob violence at the scene of traffic accidents 
(cases 2 and 15). Although some may argue that mob action falls outside the 
purview of collective action as it is normally defined, it clearly has instrumental 
significance for the group involved. Local people congregated at the scene of 
accidents and acted in order to achieve compensation for any victims, partly due to 
a widespread lack of confidence in formal judicial procedures. This forced vehicle 
owners to settle compensation quickly, and, when an acceptable settlement was 
agreed, the mob dispersed. The need for justice was also sought in shalishes over 
land disputes and in compensation for victims of violence. 
Reciprocity in relationships was linked to the norms associated with justice 
and fairness and also to the recognition of the need for subsistence (what James 
Scott refers to as the ‘subsistence ethic’ (Scott 1976)). When a person was seen as 
poor and respectable, special arrangements were made by leaders such as the UP 
chairman to protect their ability to survive. This norm is demonstrated in land 
disputes where the need for homestead land was protected (case 13); it was also 
demonstrated in cases when a collection was made for a poor victim of crime (case 
1) or after accidents (case 2). This points to the important role collective action 
plays in the formation of a system of informal social protection. Support is 
coordinated by local leaders, and help is collected from a large number of local 
people. It is common for a recently widowed woman, for example, to find sacks of 
rice delivered to her house arranged through a village collection. 
Norms of reciprocity are also key in the relationship between Union Parishad 
chairs and members and the villagers who had elected them into office. These 
actors were aware that they had entered an electoral bargain with the villagers and 
were keen to be seen as intermediaries in issues that affect the wellbeing in their 
constituencies. Their resources to achieve these ends include the ability to preside 
in shalishes and also to be able to nominate recipients of official social protection 
resources such as the Vulnerable Groups Development (VGD) program, the 
Allowances for Widows and Distressed Women, and Old Age Allowances. 
Social changes in Bangladesh influence the nature of observed collective 
action. Mobile phones now play a very important role in organizing and 
communicating with key actors. Gender roles are evolving with many more women 
working in urban areas, particularly in garments factories around Dhaka, and both 
international and national labor migration featured strongly in the stories we 
analyzed. 
SOCIAL POWER AND EVERYDAY FORMS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION  
In these collective actions and struggles various forms of social power were both at 
stake and deployed, and had constitutive as well as instrumental significance. We  
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can refer to these forms of power as ‘power–resources’ because the term best 
captures the way that social power is intertwined with economic resources.
12 
Power–resources can be categorized in various ways; in these cases they seemed 
to fall into four broad categories: 
1.  Economic power–resources; 
2.  Political and coercive power–resources; 
3.  Bureaucratic and knowledge–related power–resources; 
4.  Social network and social prestige power–resources. 
 
In these case studies, collective struggles tended to be over power–resources that 
were economic (in the case of land disputes, compensation for accidents, and theft 
and cheating) or related to maintaining social status and respectability (particularly 
in the marriage, divorce, and dowry–related events). Political, bureaucratic, 
knowledge, and social network–based power–resources were tactically deployed 
and assumed a more instrumental significance. Men and women were skilled in 
negotiating this environment of power, and collective action was instrumental in 
influencing outcomes. 
When villagers sought help from UP chairs, members, and other influential 
actors, they were aware of the power–resources held by these people and of their 
instrumental significance. For example, in case 1 when the police came to the 
village to arrest someone falsely accused of the theft, villagers phoned an ex–
chairman, who then talked to the current chairman, who in turn talked to the 
police. In case 2 the member, chairman, and the OC of the police station negotiated 
a compensation settlement from the bus company for the accident victim’s family. 
All these settlements were associated with collective mobilization by villagers. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The events explored in the fifteen case studies were complex, and often one 
episode led to another making the beginning and end points of an event difficult to 
identify. The events open a window on the way that local structures of power work 
and how effective various currencies of power are. They also throw light on values 
held and on what happens when injustice or unrespectable behavior is seen to have 
taken place. Collective action pressured local leaders to act to seek redress or 
compensation, to settle disputes, and to protect vulnerable victims of accidents or 
crime. Local arbitration through the shalish emerged as a key institution within 
episodes of collective action. However, the types of collective action that took place 
seem to have ambiguous outcomes for poor and marginalized people, and, in many 
cases, reinforced patriarchal norms that deal with dowry, early marriage, and the 
prevention of sexual relations outside of marriage, even if the solution involved 
child marriage. The collective action episodes were also mainly spontaneous, 
                                                      
 
12 Power–resources theory has been developed by researchers studying the political economy of 
welfare states, but is a useful way of conceptualizing various currencies of power as they are deployed 
in village settings (see Korpi 1985 and O'Connor et al. 1998).  
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seemed to be catalyzed by disruptive events, and usually involved groups of people 
attempting to exert influence within local power structures. 
The cases suggest that the often–celebrated role of NGOs in local collective 
action needs to be placed in a context where other more significant and more 
common forms of collective activity occur spontaneously and informally, with 
significant impact on peoples’ wellbeing, but with ambiguous outcomes for some 
poor people involved. This is a different picture from what is usually seen in 
Bangladesh, due to the visibility of NGOs, particularly to outsiders. Local 
government elected chairs and members played a key role in these events which 
often included local arbitration or shalish hearings. A deeper understanding of how 
collective disputes and struggles are commonly managed in everyday life should 
help us to hold a more realistic view of the empowerment potential of interventions 
aimed at fostering collective action in Bangladesh. 
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